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MENTAL RETARDATION AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
JOE P. TUPIN*
HAROLD A. GOOLISHIAN-1
N 1834, M'Naghten was tried for murder and was acquitted by
reason of insanity; subsequently, the House of Lords proposed
five questions to a panel of judges in hopes of delimiting the re-
sponsibility of the mentally ill. The answers of the judges constitute
the M'Naghten Rule, the essence of which is: To establish a defense
of insanity, it must be proved that the accused party was laboring
under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it,
that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.' Much dis-
cussion has ensued in the century and a quarter since that time; how-
ever, little has been changed and, in most jurisdictions, the M'Naghten
Rule is still the bench mark.
Virtually all the attention of legal and psychiatric experts has been
focused on mental illness and criminal acts, while little or no notice
has been given to other aberrations of behavior that may predispose a
person to criminal behavior, or vitiate criminal responsibility. The most
prevalent of these conditions is mental retardation.
A careful study of prison inmates done by the George Washington
University Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Criminology shows that
9.5 per cent of those surveyed had an IQ below seventy. This finding
is based on IQ scores from 90,477 prison records. Of these scores, 1.6
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1 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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per cent fell below fifty-five.2 No precise figures are available on pre-
valence of retardation, but it is estimated that at least three per cent
of the entire population is affected.' This comparison demonstrates
that the mentally retarded are over-represented in prison populations.
Furthermore, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement reports
that the further a person goes in the judicial process (i.e., from arrest
to prison), the greater the likelihood that he is retarded.'
The American Psychiatric Association has defined mental retardation
as "subnormal general intellectual functioning which originates during
the developmental period and is associated with impairment of either
learning and social adjustment or maturation or both."5
Mental retardation is classified into four categories expressed in
terms of degree and attendant characteristics:
Profound-Some motor and speech development; may achieve very limited self-
care; needs nursing care. IQ: less than twenty.
Severe -Can talk or learn to communicate; may be trained in elemental health
habits; may contribute partially to self-maintenance under complete
supervision; can develop self-protection skills to a minimal useful level
in controlled environment. IQ: twenty to thirty-five.
Moderate-Can profit from training in social and occupational skills; unlikely to
progress beyond second grade level in academic subjects; may achieve
self-maintenance in unskilled or semi-skilled work under sheltered con-
ditions; needs supervision and guidance when under mild social or
economic stress. IQ: thirty-six to fifty-one.
Mild -May learn acadamic skills up to approximately sixth grade level by
late teens; can be guided toward social conformity. IQ: fifty-two to
sixty-seven.,
The "causes" of mental retardation are diverse. They occur early in
life and may range from an isolated biological accident to various com-
binations of social, cultural and psychological factors. Little can be
2 Brown and Courtless, The Mentally Retarded in Penal and Correctional Institutions,
124 AmER. J. PSYCHIAT. 1164, 1166 (1968). "IQ" is the abbreviation for "Intelligence
Quotient" and is obtained by use of standards typified by the Stanford-Binet and
Wechsler-Bellvue tests. Verbal, mathematical, motor-visual activities, and other skills
are measured; the actual performance (mental age) is compared to expected performance
(chronological age); and this score is the IQ. Average (normal) is considered 90 to
110.
3 Cytryn and Lourie, Mental Retardation, in Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry
820 (Freedman and Kaplan eds. 1967).
4 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
5 AMEICAN PsycHIATRic ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR
MENTAL DISORDERS 14 (2d ed. 1968),
6 1d.
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done to remove or cure the cause of the condition once it is present.
The "effect" is the important aspect of mental retardation, because it
can be modified through proper training and treatment.
"Idiot," "imbecile," and "moron" labels are no longer used; "Mild,"
"moderate," "severe" and "profound mental retardation" as described
above are now the accepted descriptive terms. The American Psychi-
atric Association emphasizes that:
[t]he Intelligence Quotient should not be the only criterion used in making a
diagnosis of mental retardation or in evaluating its severity. It should serve only
to help in making a clinical judgment of the patient's adaptive behavioral capacity.
This judgment should also be based on an evaluation of the patient's develop-
mental history and present functioning, including academic and vocational achieve-
ment, motor skills, and social and emotional maturity.7
This emphasis clearly underscores the importance, not of the defen-
dant's diagnosis, condition, or IQ, but rather, of his capacity to control
his behavior under the circumstances of the act.
Since mental retardation is a chronic process originating early in life,
it interferes with a person's acquisition of knowledge. One of the most
important kinds of knowledge is that related to moral concepts and
social standards. If the person has difficulty learning, as we know the
mentally retarded person does, he will have great difficulty acquiring
the information necessary to provide a sound basis upon which to make
judgments about right and wrong. This is not to say that he cannot
learn right and wrong as fact; rather, he finds it difficult to generalize
or form abstract concepts and to apply the information to specific situ-
ations. In addition, stress of any sort may further reduce his capacity
to judge the social appropriateness of his actions.
Similar comments can be made about personality development. The
mentally retarded person runs a very high risk of psychotic illness and
other types of psychiatric disturbance. An unstable personality would
further reduce the retarded person's capacity to control his behavior
and make reasoned, cautious decisions about his behavior.
The M'Naghten Rule evolved from a need to react to the issue of
criminal responsibility of the mentally ill. It is not a valid test of the
retarded person's capacity to be legally responsible. Any attempt to
consider mental retardation within the framework of the M'Naghten
test raises two questions: (a) Is mental retardation a disease? and
(b) How will mental retardation affect a person's knowledge of the
7 d.
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nature and quality of an act and his knowledge of the wrongfulness of
his act?' The inadequacy of the M'Naghten Rule is clear, for first,
mental retardation is not a disease as is assumed under the M'Naghten
test for mental illness, and second, mental retardation does not neces-
sarily interfere with knowledge of right and wrong, but may signifi-
cantly impair the ability to generalize and apply this knowledge to a
specific action.
The failure of the courts to recognize mental retardation as a con-
dition that qualifies as a disease under the terms of the M'Naghten
Rule has resulted in the courts excluding it as a basis for defense. The
case of State v. Schlaps illustrates this. The court stated:
Protection is always afforded in courts of law to persons of unsound mind. Dis-
tinction is made between sanity and insanity in people, but not as respects their
grade of intelligence. The law does not attempt to measure degrees of intellect,
nor to make a distinction with respect thereto, where the power of thought and
reason exists.)
As recently as 1961, the Arkansas court restricted the meaning of the
term "disease" to "psychosis," thereby rejecting the acceptability of
mental retardation as a defense.' Thus, the courts recognize insanity
or lunacy as a defense, but hold that "weakness of mind" is no excuse!
When mental retardation has been raised as a defense, the issue has
been clouded by the inapplicability of the M'Naghten Rule to the men-
tally retarded person's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act.
The courts have held that "[s]ubnormal mentality is not a defense to
crime unless the accused is by reason thereof unable to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong with respect to the particular act in question.""
The defendant is required to prove that he was unable to make this
distinction at the time he committed the act. Under the best of circum-
stances (even in the case of severe psychosis), it is difficult, if not
impossible, to prove this negative proposition.
Recent rulings in cases where mental illness is the defense have
tended to view the criminal behavior as a result of "mental defect or
deficiency" which may reduce the person's ability to control his be-
havior. The criteria utilized to attempt to determine the extent to
8 Pieski, Subnormal Mentality as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 15 VANo. L. REV.
769 (1962).
9 78 Mont. 560, 578, 254 P. 857, 863 (1927).
10 Stewart v. State, 233 Ark. 458, 345 S.W.2d 472 (1961).
11Washington v. State, 165 Neb. 275, 278, 85 N.W.2d 509, 511 (1926).
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which behavior is a product of mental disease or deficiency are incor-
porated in a part of Durham v. United States2 and in the Model Penal
Code.1
3
The M'Naghten Rule defines responsibility in terms of intellectual
appreciation of the act and its consequences. It is likely, unless the
person is severely or profoundly retarded, that he will have the capa-
city to understand the nature and consequences of his act and will be
unable to establish a defense of insanity or altered responsibility under
the M'Naghten Rule. Indeed, he is not psychotic or acting under delu-
sions, but rather it is his lack of appreciation for the subtleties of social
interaction and abstract concepts of right and wrong that impair his
behavior.
Recent attempts to modify the M'Naghten Rule attest to the dis-
satisfaction of the courts and of legal and psychiatric experts. It has
been criticized because of alleged inhumanity: "It practically holds a
man confessed to be insane accountable for the exercise of the reason,
judgment and controlling mental power that is required of a man in
perfect health."' 4 Other critics have charged the criterion is too limited,
claiming it only assesses cognitive factors and ignores other aspects of
the person that may have contributed to the act. Further, it establishes
a rigid dichotomy between sickness and health which ignores the bor-
derline cases. Behavior is rarely so clear-cut. The rule is exclusively a
limited test of responsibility which forces categorization of the person's
behavior so that the court may discharge its duty regarding punish-
ment. It does not operate to help the defendant obtain treatment for a
disability which, if not corrected, may pose a potential danger to soci-
ety when the prison term has been served.
Modifications have been developed and are typified by the New
Hampshire procedure, 15 the Durham decision, the English Homicide
Act of 1957,1 and the Model Penal Code of this country. Primarily
these modifications act to reduce or remove responsibility if the act
arises out of or is a product of a mental disease or defect. Additionally,
12 214 F.2d 862, 875, 45 A.L.R.2d 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
13 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). See supra note 4, at
126, 142.
14 State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 387 (1871).
15 See Overholser, Major Principles of Forensic Psychiatry, in 2 THE AMERICAN HAND-
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1893 (Arieti ed. 1959).
16 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 2, §§ 1-15, at 15 (1957).
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their emphasis is to allow the jury to decide if a relationship exists be-
tween the mental state and the act and, if so, to what extent it should
modify the court's action. These changes provide for recognition of the
individual and his life predicament, considering the question of mental
illness as fact rather than as a function of a procedural rule.
The court has at least three areas of responsibility in regard to any
criminal act: (1) Did the person commit the act? (2) Was he legally
responsible? (3) What is the appropriate social response (disposition)?
Numerous solutions have been suggested to the dilemma posed by the
mentally retarded person's behavior. Modifications have been suggested
which relate to each of these three areas of the court's domain.
Partial responsibility: This approach argues basically that the mentally
retarded person may not have sufficient intellect to formulate an effec-
tive plan-that is, he cannot commit a premeditated crime and, conse-
quently, cannot face certain charges. For example, he may be charged
with manslaughter rather than first-degree murder. This notion tends
to break down in application, however, as evidenced by the case of
Commonwealth v. Stewart17 in which the jury was instructed that sub-
normal mentality would be a defense only if the defendant did not
thereby have sufficient mental capacity to entertain an evil intent for
killing. The jury decided the defendant did have the requisite mental
capacity, and the court rejected the defendant's plea to use the mere
fact of mental retardation as a defense on the following grounds:
Criminal responsibility does not depend upon the mental age of the defendant,
nor upon the question whether the mind of the prisoner is above or below that
of the ideal, or of the average, or of the normal man, but upon the question
whether the defendant knows the difference between right and wrong, can under-
stand the relation which he bears to others and which others bear to him, and
has knowledge of the nature of his act so as to be able to perceive its true
character and consequences to himself and to others.18
This approach has many drawbacks. It would be difficult to assign a
percentage of responsibility or to uniformly place the person in the
"right" category of charge. Furthermore, the only outcome must still
be that of guilt or innocence in terms of the act, and the social response
is limited to one of reduced sentence in prison, not treatment or train-
ing. In any event, the mentally retarded person is still labeled as a
criminal and sent to prison.
17 255 Mass. 9, 151 N.E. 74 (1926).
18 Id. at 13, 151 N.E. at 74-75.
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Another variation of the reduced responsibility approach would be
to use the person's mental age as a criterion for criminal responsibility.
This is a tempting idea which has been tried in some jurisdictions. It
works on the basis that if, on the appropriate tests, the person has a
mental age of twelve and the laws of that state do not hold a twelve
year-old criminally responsible, then the person is found not guilty or
is referred to a juvenile court. Although this may respond more to the
person as an individual and his capacity, it has some shortcomings.
Measurement of mental age cannot be completely accurate, and, since
it depends heavily on intellectual achievement, it takes very little ac-
count of social judgment and those other qualities that may contribute
to a person's behavior. In addition, once a person is declared a minor
and, perhaps, a ward of the court, this stigma may remain with him
for the rest of his life.
Mitigated punishment: This approach, like the preceding one, reacts
only to a part of the problem facing the court-that of the social re-
sponse. It also allows the person to be labeled criminal; however, it is
slightly more acceptable than the reduced responsibility concept if the
court has sufficient latitude in determining response. For example, if
the court can send the person to a school for the mentally retarded
rather than just reducing the sentence, it would seem more desirable.
Still, the person is found guilty of the act without official recognition
of that mental state which was significant to its commission. Also, the
possibility of a prison sentence remains, which, even if it is five rather
than ten years, is far from just. One may deduce from the reduced
punishment that the person also has a reduced responsibility, but this
assumption may never be made explicit.
Separation of the fact of commission of the act from the responsibility/
response issues: The George Washington study found that no pretrial
psychological or psychiatric examinations were made in seventy-eight
per cent of the cases studied, and such examinations were never or-
dered during trial. Also, no presentence study was made in eighty per
cent of the cases, and, where such studies were undertaken, they did
not include psychiatric or psychometric examinations. 9 This alterna-
tive suggests that the courts first determine whether the person com-
mitted the act. Once this question has been resolved, a second hearing
1 9 Suipra note 2, at 1168.
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or trial, utilizing expert testimony, would be convened to assess the
issue of criminal responsibility and social response. This would make
maximum use of experts and allow a balanced response considering the
needs of the community, the court, and the individual. Nevertheless,
it is a clear departure from the traditional legal approach which dic-
tates that the fact of commission and responsibility be judged simul-
taneously. Unfortunately, it would place a burden on the courts and
the various professional groups concerned that could probably not be
discharged, but it may ultimately be the best of the several suggestions
if it can be made workable and made to fit into the legal machinery.
Another approach is reflected in the report of the Texas Law Task
Force of the Governor's Commission on Mental Retardation 2 1 which
suggests that, in those cases where it is intended that evidence of men-
tal retardation in the accused be offered, either during the trial or after
the verdict (but prior to sentencing), the defense counsel should be
uniformly encouraged to file a motion for probation before the trial
commences. In this situation, a pretrial judgment can be made, leading
to an assessment of responsibility and a formulation of social response
without entering into the question of fact. This allows the court great
latitude in dealing with the accused and, hopefully, would lead to an
appropriate solution such as sending the person to a school for the
retarded. The disadvantage is that a social act may result in confine-
ment without due process. Many people may object that a person
should not be forced to accept treatment of any sort without his in-
formed consent or due process.
Although separating the question of whether or not the person com-
mitted the act from the responsibility/response issues seems to offer
the most reasonable approach, further study must be given the matter.
Just as the Model Penal Code gives an authoritative and enlightened
guide for the defense of criminal acts arising from mental illness, so
must an authoritative statement be enunciated regarding mental retar-
dation. Foremost is the need to introduce the concept of mental retar-
dation to the courts and to clearly differentiate it from mental illness.
To do so without developing adequate legal procedures for response to
the problem might court disaster by generating acquittals without a
20 GOVERNOR'S INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION PLANNING AND
GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION PLANNING, EXCERPTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS PROM THE TEXAS PLAN TO COMBAT MENTAL RETARDATION 27 (1966).
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mechanism for securing protection for society and rehabilitation and
treatment for the retarded.
Study must be devoted to a comprehensive mechanism-relevant to
determination of criminal responsibility and social response-so that
mental retardation will be separated from mental illness and so that
the response will be directly related to those characteristics unique to
the retarded. This determination must be made by an appropriate
group of experts and should be accorded the prestige which the Model
Penal Code has for mental illness.
The difficulties of dealing with mental retardation must be recog-
nized in determining the proper response. The person who is mentally
retarded has a fixed, chronic condition which cannot be "cured" as a
disease can. He will not just "grow up" intellectually-that is, the
twenty-four year old person with a mental age of twelve will not pro-
gress to an adult mental capacity by age forty. This is not, however,
an untreatable or unmanageable condition. The behavior of the men-
tally retarded can often be modified by education or training. A com-
plete return to normal or a significant change in IQ is not expected,
but appropriate treatment can produce changes in behavior.
The retarded person who commits a criminal act on one occasion may
very well do so on another if no restitutive intervention has occurred.
Indeed, the George Washington study found that the retarded prison-
ers studied averaged 3.9 adult criminal convictions for serious acts,
typified by the fact that thirty-eight per cent of their cases were crimi-
nal homicides. The retardates have spent an average of seven years in
incarceration since age sixteen or an average of forty-one per cent of
adult life in prison. It is estimated that as many as 16,000 mentally
retarded adults are incarcerated in correctional institutions.2'
Despite these rather dismal statistics, the mentally retarded person
does have the potential for rehabilitation. It may be argued that it is
no worse to put him in a penitentiary than in a mental hospital or spe-
cial school if he is going to remain there the rest of his life. With the
state of treatment as it is today, this may be true. Staffing patterns
are poor in many state hospitals; schools for the retarded and treat-
ment approaches frequently leave much to be desired. Still, it is un-
acceptable, both on moral and medical grounds, to assign the mentally
2 1 Supra note 2, at 1166.
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retarded to the penitentiary. Of the penal institutions responding in
the George Washington study, sixty per cent did not have specialized
treatment programs for retardates and ninety per cent did not segre-
gate the retarded inmates. 2 At least the school for the retarded or the
mental hospital has the intent of treatment and rehabilitation, provid-
ing some hope for improved social behavior. It should be emphasized
that though the mental retardate is not curable in the usual medical
sense, he is capable of being trained, educated, and placed in an envi-
ronment that will maximize the capacity for behavioral control.
The growing public interest and efforts to cope with the problems of
mental retardation stress the urgency of this issue. More and more the
trend is not for the retardate to be removed from his home and sent to
a training school; rather, it is to develop community-based resources to
maintain him within a familiar social setting, with a job, family, and
friends. This places an added strain on community legal resources, be-
cause every effort must be made to minimize the risk of criminal be-
havior and to establish appropriate mechanisms of response to avoid
the shame of criminal life for the retarded. If the retardate is to remain
in the community where opportunity is greatest, he must be protected
from involvement in criminal activity, and the community must receive
sufficient protection while the courts discharge their responsibility.
The problem of criminal responsibility in the mentally retarded is a
complex issue which is not being adequately handled at this time. We
would strongly encourage the courts and the legal profession to address
themselves to this problem. We would encourage review of legal pro-
cedures in the light of the substantial number of mentally retarded
persons who succumb to criminal behavior and in the light of available
and emerging community resources for them. We would urge a search
for a mechanism that will more appropriately defend the mentally re-
tarded while protecting the community and discharging the court's
responsibility. Finally, we would suggest that resolution of this prob-
lem will require concerted effort and study by the American Bar Asso-
ciation taking into consideration the knowledge and findings of medical
and behavioral sciences regarding mental retardation.
22 Supra note 2, at 1167.
